Investigation of Data Deletion Vulnerabilities in NAND Flash Memory
  Based Storage by Garg, Abhilash et al.
Investigation of Data Deletion Vulnerabilities in
NAND Flash Memory Based Storage
Abhilash Garg ID 1, Supriya Chakraborty ID 1, Manoj Malik2, Devesh Kumar2, Satyajeet Singh2 and Manan Suri ID 1
1. Department of Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, India.
2. Defence Research and Development Organization, India.
manansuri@ee.iitd.ac.in
Abstract—Semiconductor NAND Flash based memory technol-
ogy dominates the electronic Non-Volatile storage media market.
Though NAND Flash offers superior performance and reliability
over conventional magnetic HDDs, yet it suffers from certain
data-security vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities can expose
sensitive information stored on the media to security risks. It
is thus necessary to study in detail the fundamental reasons
behind data-security vulnerabilities of NAND Flash for use in
critical applications. In this paper, the problem of unreliable
data-deletion/sanitization in commercial NAND Flash media is
investigated along with the fundamental reasons leading to
such vulnerabilities. Exhaustive software based data recovery
experiments (multiple iterations) has been carried out on com-
mercial NAND Flash storage media (8 GB and 16 GB) for
different types of filesystems (NTFS and FAT) and OS specific
delete/Erase instructions. 100 % data recovery is obtained for
windows and linux based delete/Erase commands. Inverse effect
of performance enhancement techniques like wear levelling, bad
block management etc. is also observed with the help of software
based recovery experiments.
Index Terms—Data Security, Data Sanitization, Deletion Vul-
nerabilities, Flash Memory, Non-Volatile Memory
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Flash memory has gained popularity in
storage market with its increasing use in both embedded
and standalone memory products. Embedded products include
microcontrollers, SoCs while standalone products include solid
state drives (SSDs), USB drives, Compact Flash (CF) cards,
SD cards etc. NOR Flash is widely used in code storage
applications due to its faster speed and random access capabil-
ities whereas NAND Flash has its dominance in mass storage
applications due to its high density/low cost per bit advantage
[1]. Evolution of 3D NAND Flash memories has greatly
improved the density and cost per-bit and enabled it as an
undisputed NVM contender in the present day semiconductor
memory market [2]. Over the last few decades, focus of the
Flash industry has revolved around building storage media
that are: (i) extremely dense (low-cost per bit), (ii) faster,
(iii) low-power, (iv) have high cycling endurance, and (v)
strong data retention capabilities [3]. These properties have
added value to the Flash memory products but at the same
time they have led to vulnerabilities associated with data
deletion and security [4]–[6]. Such data deletion vulnerabilities
create serious concern for sensitive data (example- defense and
strategic applications). Key contributions of this paper are:
Fig. 1. (a) Floating gate (FG) type Flash memory cell. (b) Charge Trap type
Flash memory cell.
• Identification and systematic categorization of different
factors which result in data deletion vulnerabilities in
Flash based storage.
• Supporting the assertions, by exhaustive software-
recovery tool based data recovery experiments performed
across multiple stored file types (texts, Images, Audio,
Video, compressed, executables etc.) and filesystems
(NTFS and FAT).
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the security relevant basics and system level organization
of Flash memory technology. Section III, discusses multiple
different reasons for data deletion vulnerabilities in Flash
memory. Section IV, discusses the approach of software based
data recovery for different file-systems. Section V, presents
multiple experimental results of successful data recovery from
USB NAND Flash storage media post-deletion. Section VI
presents the conclusion of the study.
II. FLASH MEMORY TECHNOLOGY
A. Flash Memory Cell Basics
Flash cell transistor, also known as the Floating-Gate (FG)
transistor similar to conventional NMOS transistor device with
a ”Stacked Gate” configuration is shown in Fig. 1(a). Top
most layer in the FG stack structure is called as Control Gate
(CG), it acts like a normal gate which can control the current
passing through the transistor. Below the CG lies a blocking
dielectric layer (BO), usually made up of layered oxide-nitride-
oxide (ONO). The term blocking oxide or blocking layer is
used because the function of this ONO layer is to prevent
any charge carrier movement either from the CG or towards
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Fig. 2. (a) Threshold voltage modulation in FG Flash device during program-
ming, (b) Read/Sense Operation in FG device.
the CG from the layers below the CG. Below the BO lies a
second gate, called as floating gate (FG), usually made up of
poly-silicon [7]. The term floating-gate is used to denote this
layer as it doesn’t have any terminal or external contact to
directly control its potential or apply any signal to it. Below
the FG lies the thin tunnel oxide layer, usually made up of
high quality silicon dioxide [7]. Additionally, in some type of
emerging Flash memory, nitride (ONO) itself is used as charge
trapping layer by performing engineering on the stack. This is
called Charge Trap type Flash memory as shown in Fig. 1(b).
B. Cell Programming Mechanism: Write, Erase, Read
Basic underlying principle of FG Flash memory cell de-
pends on sensing the relative change in threshold voltage
of the device when charge is either intentionally trapped
or de-trapped inside the charge-trapping layer. The process
of modulating the threshold voltage of Flash cell by either
injecting charges (Write) or removing charges (Erase) from
the Flash charge trapping layers is defined as programming of
the Flash memory cell (see Fig. 2(a)). Programmed state of a
Flash cell can be validated by measuring the amount of current
passing through the drain terminal of the cell on application
of a fixed Control-gate voltage (Read Voltage). This process
is defined as ”reading”. For a given read-voltage, negligible or
∼ zero drain current indicates that the cell threshold voltage is
higher than applied read-voltage, and this state can be defined
as the state storing logic ’0’. If measurable current (∼ uA to
∼ mA) flows from the drain terminal on application of a read-
voltage it means an inversion channel has been formed. This
turn-on state can be defined as the state storing logic ’1’. Read
operation based on threshold voltage sensing is illustrated in
Fig. 2(b).
Different physical mechanisms and techniques exist in litera-
ture for charge injection into the FG [8]. Two most common
include: (i) Channel Hot Electron Injection (CHE), and (ii)
Fowler-Nordheim (FN) tunneling. CHE mechanism relies on
first accelerating the channel electrons using a lateral electric
field (between source and drain) and then force injecting the
energetic charge carriers to the floating gate, through the tunnel
oxide, with the help of vertical electric field (between channel
and CG) (see Fig. 3(a)).
In Fowler-Nordheim (FN) tunneling, a sufficiently high verti-
cal electric field between the CG and channel region is main-
Fig. 3. Programming mechanisms for FG Flash devices: (a) CHE/HEI, and
(b) FN tunneling.
Fig. 4. System organization and abstraction layers in Flash memory based
storage media.
tained (Fig. 3(b)). This leads to steep energy band diagram for
the oxide region; thus significantly increasing the probability
of electron tunneling through the tunnel-oxide energy barrier.
NOR Flash, mainly uses CHE injection mechanism for Write
operation, and FN tunneling for Erase operation [7]. While
NAND Flash uses FN tunneling for both Write and Erase [1].
C. System Level Organization
System organization for a Flash memory based storage
media can be divided into following three major components
or layers of abstraction (Fig. 4) [9]:
1) Hardware (Storage medium, Controller, Host Interface)
2) System Software (Device drivers, Firmware, File Sys-
tem)
3) User-space software (i.e. applications like File Man-
agers/File Browsers)
Fig. 5. Categorization of Flash data-deletion/sanitization vulnerabilities in
different categories.
Every abstraction layer between end-user and the memory
device array/chip makes the Flash structure more complex.
Complexity in structure results in data-deletion/sanitization
related vulnerabilities which are discussed in detail in the
following section (section III).
III. DATA DELETION VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we analyze a comprehensive list of differ-
ent possible data-deletion/sanitization vulnerabilities in Flash
memory based storage media, across all abstraction layers. We
group all vulnerabilities in four different categories (Physics,
Performance, System Complexity, and Intentional, Fig. 5)
based on the underlying technical motivations and reasons.
A. Physics Based Reasons
Major reason giving rise to deletion vulnerability in Flash
storage is its underlying charge based information storage prin-
ciple. Stored state of a FG Flash device depends upon the rel-
ative difference in its threshold voltage which is proportional
to the amount of charge stored in the charge trapping layer
(Fig. 6). It is worth noting that charge carriers (electrons/holes)
will behave quantum mechanically and in terms of popula-
tions. In other words, when FG Flash device is programmed
to state ’1’ a certain finite number (population) of electrons
are injected in the charge trapping layer volume (and not just
a single electron). When the device undergoes Erase operation
the threshold voltage based sensing/reading mechanism may
indicate successful Erase or switching to state ’0’ even when
the entire population of electrons that was injected is not
completely de-trapped and few electrons are still left behind.
The quanta of charge carriers trapped or de-trapped from the
charge-trapping layer will depend upon the device dimensions
and the exact programming conditions (voltages, duration,
resultant E-fields) applied during Write/Erase operations. Eras-
ing or de-trapping of charge back to substrate will happen
similar to a capacitive decay leaving behind some remanent
charges [10], [11]. There is no guarantee that the OS/data-sheet
defined digital Erase instruction ensures zero trapped charges
in the charge-trapping layer post completion of the Erase
process. The user has no control over the analog parameters
(voltages/duration) of the programming conditions applied.
In case of modern Multi-level-cell (MLC) Flash memories,
Fig. 6. Write/Erase operation state definition based on charge trapping/de-
trapping in FG Flash memory device.
this problem becomes even more pronounced and need to be
addressed [12]. These factors may lead to a so called charge
remanence post-Erase. Remanent charges or charge contrast in
Flash cells can be observed with advanced nanomaterial char-
acterization techniques like: Scanning Electron Microscopy
(SEM) and Scanning Probe Microscopy (SPM) (AFM, SCM)
[13]–[15]. Based on the amount of residual charges, detailed
physics based/empirical models can be built, which can predict
the previous state of the Flash device prior to the launch
of an Erase or Overwrite instruction. Remanent charges al-
low to distinguish between previously programmed and non-
programmed FG devices in terms of threshold voltage, even
after one hundred Erase cycles [10]. Thus adversaries may
exploit such residual charge sensing or charge-contrast sensing
to recover and decode deleted/Erased/Overwritten data.
B. Performance Based Reasons
Second primary category of reasons for deletion vulnerabil-
ities can be attributed to Flash storage media’s performance
enhancement related factors. Performance optimization tricks
may lead to data security trade-offs in some cases. Key per-
formance metrics of interest include (Fig. 5): (i) programming
latency, (ii) programming energy/power, (iii) data retention,
(iv) endurance and (v) error management.
Programming latency and energy/power: In commercial
NAND Flash based storage media, in order to optimize the
Flash Write/Erase performance (i.e. speed, power), the cell
threshold sensing margin is defined such that even partial
removal or addition of charge can be sensed as successful
completion of Erase/Write instructions. These factors may lead
to a so called charge remanence post-Erase. As described
in section III-A, this remanent charge can be sensed in the
form of charge contrast by using nanomaterial characterization
techniques to predict previously stored state of the Flash
device.
Retention: High retention in Flash devices ensures that a
residual trapped charge post Erase is very less likely to be
lost and thus enhances the probability of information recovery
even after long time.
Endurance: Flash memory devices often suffer from low
endurance (less than 10,000 Write/Erase cycles [8]). To vir-
tually enhance the endurance of Flash memory based storage
Fig. 7. Mapping of logical blocks to physical blocks inside FTL [1].
Fig. 8. Replacement of bad physical blocks with fresh reserved blocks [1].
media, File translation Layer (FTL) provide techniques like
wear-levelling, garbage collection, bad block management
etc. which are implemented inside memory controller [16].
These techniques use address mapping to map logical blocks
to physical buffer blocks of memory with the help of file
translation tables as shown in Fig. 7 [17]. Whenever host issues
instruction to write data on a specific address, the memory
controller may dynamically map same logical address to a
different physical address, in order to uniformly distribute
cycling. Such mapping information is stored in a translation
table. Thus wear levelling helps in intelligent distribution of
Write/Erase cycles across different Flash memory devices on
the chip to improve endurance. As a consequence of wear lev-
elling, previously written data may still exist in physical Flash
devices, giving rise to data remanence problem. Whenever a
physical block reaches its endurance limit then its mapping
gets replaced with the fresh reserved physical block (Fig. 8)
with the help of bad block management module, but data in
old physical blocks remain intact and can be accessed/retrieved
leading to data-deletion/sanitization vulnerability.
C. System Complexity Based Reasons
Major factors causing system complexity related data-
deletion/sanitization vulnerabilities in Flash memory based
storage media include (Fig. 5): (i) design of OS/Host, and
(ii) Filesystem. As described in section II-C, NAND Flash
memory based storage media have multiple abstraction lay-
ers/interfaces above raw Flash devices which makes storage
system complex (Fig. 4). These layers include: (i) hardware,
(ii) system software, and (iii) user space software. These ab-
straction layers/interfaces make storage media suitable for end-
user application and Host interaction with the Flash devices but
it adds more stages of data-deletion/sanitization vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities caused by the hardware abstraction layer are
discussed in section III-A and section III-B. System software
related data-deletion/sanitization vulnerabilities arises from
OS/Host and Filesystem.
OS/Host: Design of OS or utility programs to delete data
are not upto the mark (see section V). OS can provide local
buffer/file retention facility, instead of deleting files it can
move them to a holding area (example Recycle Bin) from
where files can easily be recovered back. OS generally re-
moves entries from filesystem directory, upon execution of file
deletion command, by only ‘marking’ the previously occupied
space as ‘unused’ and ‘free’ for further writing. Actually data
may still remain in the physical Flash devices for long duration
[18].
Filesystem: It generally stores metadata (e.g. path names, last
modified time, etc.) of deleted files. By using this metadata
files can be recovered back using easily available software
recovery tools [19]. File recovery using filesystem has been
described in section IV. Reformatting an entire storage media
or a partition implies the destruction of filesystem metadata,
but does not guarantee that the data present in the formatted
area is completely erased at the physical Flash device charge
level (deletion vulnerabilities due to hardware abstraction layer
may still cause data remanence) [20].
D. Intentional Reasons
Vulnerabilities discussed in sections III-A-III-C are not di-
rectly implemented procedures for information leakage. They
are either consequences of some physical phenomenon or
consequences of some performance enhancement technique
implemented inside NAND Flash based storage technology.
However, an adversary may intentionally introduce vulnera-
bilities without user’s knowledge. Major intentional vulnera-
bilities include: (i) backdoors, (ii) trojans, (iii) side channel
attacks, and (iv) provision of redundant memory cells.
Backdoors and Trojans: These are intentionally introduced
threats in semiconductor ICs to provide unauthorized access
to control or information of a system. They may change the
functionality of memory circuits when activated. Trojans can
be activated internally (by inbuilt circuit logic) or externally
(by using antennas, sensors etc.). Such vulnerabilities can only
be introduced during design/fabrication phase of the IC or the
PCB [21]. Detection and protection against such provisions
are very unlikely for a normal user. Backdoors have been
successfully discovered even in military chips in the past [22].
Side Channel Attacks: Information from Flash based storage
media can be recovered/retrieved successfully by exploiting
external or indirect parameters such as timing information,
optical, acoustic, power etc. Information can also be extracted
from Flash based storage media by using bumping attacks
[23]. Apart from unauthorized data extraction, side channel
attacks may also be used to modify, manipulate or destroy
the stored data. For instance, content of Flash devices can
be altered successfully by locally heating them [24]. These
factors create serious threat when confidential data is stored
inside Flash storage media (example: cryptographic keys).
Redundant cells: Recently, as Flash memory density has
drastically increased, it has led to significant on-chip silicon
area savings for Flash arrays of fixed sizes. The saved die-area
can be utilized by adversaries to introduce malicious circuits,
IPs or even redundant Flash memory cells. Since silicon area
remains the same, the malicious circuit/device addition bears
no extra cost or area on the Flash memory chip. Redundant
cells may contain copy of user data and can only be accessed
by using special adversary instructions. An adversary having
access to this special instruction set to access the storage media
can easily hack user data without their knowledge.
Flash based storage technology follow increasingly stan-
dardized and cross platform compatible protocols and inter-
faces (ONFI, SCSI, SATA etc.). If an adversary manages
to hack one type of Flash storage media then replicating
the methodology across different commercial storage media’s
would be probable.
IV. DATA RECOVERY IN FLASH MEMORY
Data can be successfully recovered from Flash based storage
media by exploiting vulnerabilities described in section III,
in following ways: (i) with the help of software recovery
tools [19], (ii) by building comprehensive embedded test
environment [6], and (iii) by direct charge/charge contrast
measurement of Flash devices [15].
Data recovery softwares exploit vulnerability of filesys-
tem for successful recovery post-deletion. Different data-
recovery tools are available which are helpful in recovering
deleted/corrupted files from a normal/damaged (Flash and
HDD) storage media. Where the main intent behind building
these tools was to help users recover their valuable files if
accidentally lost, they can always be misused for recovering
data in unauthorized manner that has been deleted by an end-
user.
File Recovery softwares work on a systematic process which
involves scanning of deleted entries in the disk space, cluster
chain definition for deleted entries and finally recovering data
using these cluster chains. These deleted entries are stored
in Root Folders on FAT12, FAT16, FAT32 or in Master
File Table (MFT) on NTFS, NTFS5 filesystems. Different
filesystems have different structure for files/folders but basic
attributes (name, size, creation and modification time/date,
existing/deleted status, etc.) are always present in all of these
filesystems. Record of deleted entries are stored differently
for different filesystems. In NTFS, file header provide special
attribute for deleted files/folders and in FAT ASCII symbol
0xE5 (229) is used to mark files/folders deleted. By scanning
MFT record for these attributes information about deleted
files/folders is extracted. First 42 Bytes (starting from 0x00) in
MFT contains file record header in which Flag field (2 Bytes)
provides information about whether the file is deleted or still
in-use. If the flag bit is set to ‘1’ then file is in-use otherwise
deleted. MFT also contains file information attributes (creation
and modification time/date, size, name of file) starting from
Fig. 9. Example of MFT structure on NTFS filesystem which helps in data
recovery [19].
address 0x48 (68 Bytes) as shown in Fig. 9. Non Resident
Data attribute (starting from 0x188) in MFT helps in finding
compression unit size, allocated and real size of attribute and
data runs. Many more information fields about file/folder exist
in MFT which we have not discussed here, this can be found
in [19].
In this way all the information about the deleted files can be
extracted from the boot record or MFT of filesystem record.
Next step is to define cluster chains for deleted files. Complete
storage media is scanned to define cluster chain. Data Runs
give information about the location of the file clusters in NTFS
filesystem. Data Runs are decrypted by using suitable methods
as explained in [19].
After obtaining cluster chains definition successfully, next step
is to recover these cluster chains (read and save) for the
successful recovery of deleted entries. Therefore, cluster offset
is calculated using standard formula. Once the offset is known
then deleted data is copied to the new file starting from the
calculated offset to last address (file size minus number of
copied clusters multiplied by cluster size).
One research provided 3 extreme cases where data was re-
covered even after destructing the USB Flash memory with
over-voltage, soaking in water, incinerating in petrol, stomping
and hammering [25]. Another work in literature have used
FPGA based test environment and illustrated the formation of
multiple copies of same data in Flash SSDs, resulting in data
recovery after deletion [6]. Forensic data recovery from Flash
based storage media using different methods have also been
shown by [26].
V. OUR RECOVERY EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To first hand investigate data remanence and data deletion
vulnerabilities described in section III, we designed and per-
formed extensive software data-recovery experiments. We used
TABLE I
SOFTWARE DATA RECOVERY STATISTICS FOR DIFFERENT DATA DELETION
INSTRUCTIONS AND FILE TYPES.
Percentage Data Recovery
S.No. File Type Windows 10 Home Basic Ubuntu
Shift+delete Format Sudo rm -rf
1 Documents 100 % 100 % 100 %
(Text Files)
2 Image Files 100 % 100 % 100 %
3 Audio Files 100 % 100 % 100 %
4 Video Files 100 % 100 % 100 %
5 Compressed 100 % 100 % 100 %
6 Executable 100 % 100 % 100 %
Files
commercial NAND Flash USB media for the experiments.
The experiments conclusively proved the failure of vendor and
OS defined delete/Erase commands to reliably delete/sanitize
target information of different formats.
New 16 GB (14.5 GB usable) and 8 GB capacity commercial
NAND Flash USB storage media were used. For the sake of
generality; (i) Windows 10 and Linux Ubuntu 14.04 OS were
used, and (ii) USB storage media were initially formatted
to both NTFS and FAT32 filesystems to perform the data
recovery experiments. Recuva and EaseUS recovery software
tools were used for recovering the deleted/Erased data.
As the USB storage media were new, initially, there is no user-
data present on the media except the user firmware/application
files. Firstly, user sample data of different file formats (text,
images, audio, compressed, code etc.) and varying file sizes
is written on to the USB media. Then these sample data files
are deleted using different type of delete/Erase instructions
available to the user. These instructions include OS specific
deletion commands. For example, Windows offers: simple
delete, Shift+Delete (permanent delete) and Format. Linux
offers: simple delete (sudo rm -rf filename) and shred (sudo
shred -n 1 -v /dev/sdb). In order to improve the quality of
the recovery results we performed multiple trials of recovery
experiments with varying file sizes each time and varying
sample data files written in the first place. Data recovery with
the help of software recovery tools was attempted, post the
application of different OS specific delete/Erase commands.
Table I provides a summary of all software tool based
data recovery experiments. Contrary to user expectation and
perception the data was easily recovered in several cases thus
raising a cause for serious concern. Following sub-sections
describe in detail the data-recovery results and observations.
A. Data Recovery on Separate Storage Media
In these experiments the recovery tool was asked to dump
the recovered data on the Host PC/Laptop’s storage. In one
of the experiments, a total 57.6 MB data was written to the 8
GB commercial NAND Flash USB storage media. Data was in
the form of image files (.jpg, .png, .bmp, .tiff, etc.), documents
(a)
(b)
Fig. 10. Successfully recovered files after deletion (a) Recovered Image files.
(b) Recovered text (pdf) files. All files are readable.
(.doc, .docx, .ppt, .pdf, .xlsx, .rtf, . txt etc.), audio (.mp3) files,
video files (.avi, .flv, .mp4, etc.), compressed files (.rar, .zip,
.tar, etc.) and code files. After writing into the USB storage
media, these files were permanent deleted using Shift+Delete
as claimed by the Windows OS. After which recovery software
was used to recover the deleted files. All 57.6 MB of data was
recovered successfully without any distortion in file format.
Out of the recovered 57.6 MB, image files of 3.42 MB, and
1.08 MB of text (pdf) files, as recovered (post-deletion) are
shown in Fig. 10.
After unsuccessful deletion of data by shift+delete command,
quick format option in windows 10 was tried to permanently
delete data from the same USB storage media. After deleting
data by using quick format command, we used recovery
software to check for the permanent deletion of data but
this time deep scan was performed which was more time
consuming. Again entire amount of data was successfully
recovered without any distortion.
After successful recovery of data, full format option was tried
to permanently delete data from same USB storage media.
After running full format command, recovery software was run
in deep scan mode to check for data remanence but they failed
to recover any data. We suspect that this might be due to the
limitations of data recovery softwares used because successful
data recovery has been shown in literature by using customized
embedded recovery setup [25].
We also tested Linux deletion commands to delete the data
using normal delete (sudo rm -rf filename) and shred (sudo
Fig. 11. Data recovery statistics over the number of iterations for NAND
Flash USB when data is recovered on same storage media.
shred -n 1 -v /dev/sdb). Post normal-delete command, the
data was successfully recovered by using recovery software.
However, no data was recovered after shred delete command.
We suspect that data may be recovered successfully by making
customized embedded recovery setup and by using invasive
microscopy based techniques such as AFM/SCM/SEM etc
[14], [15].
B. Data Recovery on Same Storage Media
In these experiments the recovery tool was asked to dump
the recovered data on the same USB storage media from which
the recovery was being made. In one such experiment, first
5.25 MB of jpeg image data was written on to the Flash USB
storage media. After writing into the USB media, these files
were permanently deleted using Shift+Delete as claimed by
the Windows OS. After which recovery software was run,
5.25 MB data was recovered on the same storage media.
The recovered data was again deleted permanently and again
recovery was attempted. Data was partially recovered. This
has been repeated for five iterations and every time amount of
recovered data got increased. The statistics of the experiment
is shown in Fig. 11.
In an another experiment, 229 MB of sample text files (.pdf
and .txt) and 1.5 GB of audio and video files (.mp4) were writ-
ten on the storage media and then similar cyclic procedure of
’delete-recover-delete’ was performed. Initially only some text
files were readable (not audio and video) but over the number
of iterations readable text files were reduced significantly.
Some key observations of the same-storage media cyclic
’delete-recover-delete’ experiments were:
• Filenames of some files got modified or interchanged
between two cycles.
• Some files lost their original file format.
• After repeating the experiment many times, some of the
files which had lost their format in one of the previous
cycles were successfully recovered with their original
format.
Fig. 12. Partially recovered (Distorted) sample image files when data recovery
was attempted on same storage media.
• Extra/Multiple copies of certain files were recovered.
• Partial recovery of image files was also evidenced as
shown in Fig. 12.
• Some files which were lost in earlier cycles were recov-
ered in distant subsequent cycles (non-consecutive).
• With increasing number of iterations (Fig. 11), size of
recovered data increased and readable data decreased.
These observations confirm the data deletion vulnerabilities in
Flash based storage technology. Recovery of multiple copies of
same data even after deletion shows the inverse effect of wear
levelling and bad block management algorithms. Although
over the number of iterations, readable data is becoming neg-
ligible but that is due to the change in operational properties
of files. Data is still there and one can easily access that data
by restructuring operational properties of files or in worst case
by doing charge/charge contrast measurement. Data presence
in non readable files can be observed by opening those files
in notepad++.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive
study about data-deletion/sanitization related vulnerabilities
in NAND Flash memory based storage technology. All the
reasons giving rise to these deletion vulnerabilities at different
abstraction layers are discussed in detail. Software based data
recovery experiments resulted in 100 % data recovery in
windows and linux based delete/Erase commands. Similar
results are obtained for both NTFS and FAT filesystems.
Multiple copies of same data were found during data recovery
on same storage media thus confirming the inverse effect of
performance enhancement techniques like wear leveling and
bad block management.
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